Mobile device security matching lab

Match remote wipe, screen lock, MDM profile, and device encryption; leave swipe-only and skip-MDM unused.

Match each mobile security ticket. Leave swipe-only and skip-MDM unused.

CompTIA 2.8 is phone hardening: encryption, screen locks, locator, remote wipe, failed-attempt limits, and MDM profiles for BYOD vs corporate-owned.

Executive phone stolen at the airport with mail and SSO

Data must die remotely. Finding it later is optional.

Lobby tablets unlock with a finger swipe for 'speed'

Anyone walking by gets the session. Raise the lock factor.

BYOD phones have no inventory, no policy, no wipe rights

Enrollment and profiles before corporate email.

Lost phone had a lock screen but an unencrypted filesystem

Lock delays; encryption protects at rest if they bypass the UI.

Still on the bench

Remote wipe — erase corp data on a lost/stolen device — Locator finds; wipe kills the data. Pair with backups so wipe is survivable.
Require PIN/biometric/pattern screen lock — not swipe — Swipe is not a control. PIN, biometric, or pattern + failed-attempt limits are.
MDM configuration profile — enroll and enforce policy — MDM pushes encryption, lock, wipe rights, and app allow-lists. BYOD vs corporate profiles differ.
Full-device encryption before mailbox access — Lost phone with an unlocked filesystem is a breach. Encrypt at rest, then lock the screen.
Allow swipe-to-unlock so nurses can grab charts faster — Convenience is not authentication. Clinical devices still need a real lock factor.
Skip MDM — just tell users to factory-reset if anything feels weird — Hope is not inventory. MDM enrolls, enforces, and can wipe without waiting for the user.